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”Serenity in Overcoming Crises”
A Parochial Gloss on the Transnational Shift 
in Constitutional Vocabularies1
BOGDAN IANCU
INTRODUCTION: THE LANGUAGE OF CONSTITUTIONALISM
Constitutionalization and constitutionalism beyond the nation state (global, 
international, transnational, supranational, and the like) are prominent fads and 
fashions of the day. Variations on these themes resurface with predictable frequency 
in contemporary academic (political science and public law), judicial, and, to a 
more subdued but increasing degree, also in political discourse. Aside from the 
somewhat circular and repetitively tiring debates as to the possibility or opportunity 
of constitutionalizing the European Union, one hears also of the constitutionalization 
of international law under the UN Charter, of the WTO system in the aftermath of its 
quasi-judicialization through the dispute settlement bodies, of the Council of Europe 
system by way of the Strasbourg Court (ECtHR) decisions and even of the society 
itself as a result of global legal fragmentation and norm-collisions2. In the scientific 
literature, the common undertone of most contributions to the debate is dominated 
by two propensities: a general penchant for primarily abstract-theoretical discussions 
of constitutionalism beyond the state, often reaching the point of sterile pedantry, and 
the assumption, commonly unstated or implicit, that the ”constitutionalization” of 
such processes and institutions represents an unmitigated civilizational benefit for 
the world at large and newer constitutional prodigies alike.
What follows from this text will be an inquiry into the possibilities of constitu-
tionalism, when severed from its inherited contextual underpinnings, to serve 
as a satisfactory conceptual language for describing and assessing constitutional 
practices. Rather than tackling the problem in point of general theory, we will seek 
a qualified and contextualized answer to this question obversely, from the vantage 
point of a case study. The argument will analyze, namely, the way in which two 
bodies representing inter- and supranational legal systems purportedly in the process 
of constitutionalization, the European Commission for Democracy through Law 
(Venice Commission) and the EU Commission, have interacted with the Romanian 
constitutional system in the aftermath of a recent local political crisis, related to an 
attempt by the parliamentary majority in power to suspend the incumbent President. 
The interactions resulted in a number of indications rendered by these two bodies, 
as official positions on the matter. The Commission took its position as a part of its 
1 Research for this article was supported by and undertaken within the framework of 
the research project PN-II-ID-PCE-2011-3-0115, ”Governance/Government-The Constitutional 
Semantics of Autonomy”.
2 Andreas FISCHER-LESCANO, Gunther TEUBNER, Regime-Kollisionen-Zur Fragmentierung 
des globalen Rechts, Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt am Main, 2006. 
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bi-annual monitoring within the framework of the Cooperation and Verification 
Mechanism and the Venice Commission by way of an collaborative expert opinion1. 
There are, to be sure, notable differences between the two instances of external 
Constitution intervention, concerning the status of the concerned institutions and 
the strictly legal nature and effect of the acts involved. The Venice Commission, a 
consultative body of the Council of Europe, adopted, after the fact, an opinion on 
the ”compatibility with the with constitutional principles and the rule of law” of the 
actions taken, in view of expediting the impeachment process, by the Parliament and 
the Government in power. This opinion is drafted in primarily narrative form and 
detached, normative-constitutional terms. Indeed, the document reads on occasion 
much like a professorial brief on the compatibility of the Romanian Constitution with 
general ”constitutional principles”. Nominally, the act has no binding legal traction 
in Romania. However, recent judicial and jurisprudential events – references to 
documents issued by the Venice Commission in high-stake constitutional adjudication 
and a number of official letters by the Constitutional Court to the Commission, 
soliciting the latter’s help against domestic political pressures – have raised the actual 
relevance of such interventions, including their potential manipulation in local political 
contests. Moreover, the EU Commission cited in its last progress report the findings 
in the Venice opinion. Perhaps aware of their enhanced status, the members of the 
Venice Commission, in spite of the purported, relatively modest purview of the act, 
undertook not only to assess the impugned legal actions, but also suggest a number of 
remedies, among which various amendments to the Romanian Constitution as such. 
Conversely, the EU Commission is a supranational administrative institution. Its 
documents are formal acts adopted within a EU law mechanism, upon a legal basis in 
the Act of Accession2, and designed to monitor the progress undertaken by the two last 
members of the Union, Romania and Bulgaria, in terms of judicial and anti-corruption 
reforms (Bulgaria is also monitored with respect to progress in combating organized 
crime). The exact effects and status of the monitoring are somewhat unclear, given 
that, in spite of the three-year deadline set forth in the Accession Act (Arts. 36-38) and 
the specific benchmarks itemized in the initial 2006 decision of the Commission, the 
monitoring has not yet been lifted, whereas – paradoxically – its initial purview has 
seeped into ever further areas of interest and inquiry. 
In spite of these differences between the two bodies and their respective systemic-
legal contexts, a comparative treatment is warranted by the methodological constraints 
and epistemological endeavor of this argument, namely, seeking a qualified answer 
as to whether and to what extent older conceptual frameworks of references are 
useful if detached and abstracted from the context of nation-state constitutionalism. 
The argument will proceed by a brief introduction of the general problematics 
of constitutionalization and constitutionalism beyond the classical nation-state, 
continuing with a summary chronology of the Romanian events over the summer of 
2012, and closing with an analysis of the international reactions to this crisis.
1 Opinion no. 685/2012 of 17 December 2012, CDL-AD (2012) 026.
2 C (2006) 6569 final.
11
Romanian Political Science Review • vol. XIII • no. 1 • 2013
”Serenity in Overcoming Crises”
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN TRANSLATION: 
AN INTRODUCTORY GLOSSARY
When the modern form of Constitution appeared in America and France, at the 
close of the eighteenth century, it represented a break with previous Western legal 
traditions. Its evolutionary achievement was the legal regulation of the sovereign 
nation state in a comprehensive and to a certain extent reflexive manner. Rationally 
devised foundational norms predetermined now, for the first time, not just the form 
of subsequent norm production but also the juridical conditions for the possibility of 
legitimate political rule. The cleft between medieval and absolutist legal arrangements, 
on the one hand, and modern limited government, on the other, resided in the fact 
that the normative Constitution regulated both legality (the reproduction of the legal 
system, constitutional renewal included) and legitimacy (the validity preconditions 
of political rule) in a jurisdictionally comprehensive, hierarchical, and impersonal 
manner1. As post-revolutionary creations of the Age of Reason, modern constitutional 
law as a practice and the rise of the normative Constitution as a phenomenon were from 
the beginning charged with rational and universalistic demands and implications. To 
wit, in order to understand the clash of paradigms brought about by the rationalistic 
impetus of Enlightenment-derived constitutionalization, one has only to recall the 
starkly contrasting accounts of the developments in the contemporaneous tracts by 
Thomas Paine and Edmund Burke. 
The rational-universal facet of the modern legal transformation is captured by 
the umbrella notion of constitutionalism. Constitutionalism, the ”political theory that 
generally accompanies the technique”2, developed in conceptual lockstep with the rise 
and spread of constitutional forms, as a reservoir of ideological/philosophical accounts 
and justifications of the limited government and its central apparatus of concepts 
and institutions: ”the rule of law”, ”representation”, ”separation of powers”, ”judicial 
independence”, ”fundamental rights”, ”equality under the law”, etc. However, due 
to the conceptual ambiguities, dichotomies, and paradoxes of the Enlightenment 
(”modernity”)3, the residue of context and emotion in constitutional design4, and the 
related and overhanging parochial/democratic implications of political sovereignty5, 
1 On the ”reflexivity” of law under the modern constitution, see Niklas LUHMANN, 
”Verfassung als evolutionäre Errungenschaft”, Rechtshistorisches Journal, vol. 9, 1990, pp. 176-
220. On the qualitative difference between pre-modern (”descriptive”) Constitutions and 
the modern, ”normative” form, see Dieter GRIMM, Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte 1776-1866, 
Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a.M., 1988, and IDEM, ”The Achievement of Constitutionalism and its 
Prospects in a Changed World”, in Petra DOBNER, Martin LOUGHLIN (eds.), The Twilight of 
Constitutionalism?, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010, pp. 1-22.
2 Martin LOUGHLIN, ”What is Constitutionalisation?”, in Petra DOBNER, Martin 
LOUGHLIN (eds.), The Twilight…cit., pp. 47-69/p. 55. 
3 Neil WALKER, ”The Place of European Law”, in Gráinne de BÚRCA, J.H.H. WEILER 
(eds.), The Worlds of European Constitutionalism, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2012, 
pp. 57-104.
4 On the role of collectively held emotions in constitutionalism, see András SAJÓ, Constitu-
tional Sentiments, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 2011.
5 Carl SCHMITT, Verfassungslehre, Duncker & Humblodt, Berlin, 1993 (1928); Dieter 
GRIMM, Souveränität: Herkunft und Zukunft eines Schlüsselbegriffs, Berlin University Press, 
Berlin, 2011.
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constitutionalism never reached, in a world of nation-states, a satisfactory level of 
notional precision. Indeed, in extreme and from the standpoint of analytical accuracy 
justifiably, this ambiguous term has been described as ”one of those concepts, 
evocative and persuasive in its connotations yet cloudy in its analytic and descriptive 
content, which at once enrich and confuse political discourse”1. The usefulness 
and limitations of the conceptual vocabulary provided by constitutionalism to the 
actual practices of constitutional law in the various jurisdictions resided primarily 
in the creation of a structuring discursive-doctrinal framework of reference, used for 
comparison across and polemical contestation within jurisdictions. Thus, to put it 
in more exacting terms, the universal and abstract drive embedded in the language 
of constitutionalism was moored to and hedged within the concretely situated 
constitutional events and practices of the nation-state. This was all the more possible 
since, until relatively recent times, states coexisted, from a juridical point of view, to 
extrapolate Disraeli’s metaphor, in an insularly ”splendid isolation” from each other2. 
The overarching principle of modern public international law, pacta sunt servanda, is 
after all based on the formal contractualist assumptions of perfect equality among 
sovereigns. By the same token, direct interventions in the constitutional arrangements 
of foreign jurisdictions (e.g., the regime of capitulations), inasmuch as they took place, 
were primarily predicated upon considerations of opportunity (state interest) rather 
than principle3. 
Starting from the end of WWII and treading an increasingly accelerated pace 
over the last two decades or so, a process of de- and trans-nationalization of legal 
practices has been underway, to the effect that the language of constitutionalism 
was progressively detached from the state-centered practices of constitutional law. 
The exact normative implications of this general development are somewhat arcane, 
as evidenced by the overlapping and cacophonic multiplicity of imprecise and 
tentative descriptions of the unfolding events: ”transnational”, ”multi-level”, ”post-
modern”, ”global”, ”polyarchic”, ”societal”, ”international”, ”pluralist”, and, alas, even 
”mosaic”4 constitutionalism (constitutionalization; constitutional law)5. But, if the 
1 T.C. GREY, ”Constitutionalism: An Analytical Framework”, in J.R. PENNOCK, 
J.W. CHAPMAN (eds.), Constitutionalism: Nomos XX, NYU Press, New York, 1979, pp. 189-208/
p.189, quoted after Martin LOUGHLIN, ”What is Constitutionalisation?”, cit., at p. 55. 
2 ”With the constitution being a set of norms given by a state, for a state, and which is valid 
within a state, it is coextensive with the state. The constitutional order ends at the borders of a 
state, with both of them, state and constitutions, having to give way to other states, people, and 
constitutions, at these borders.” Petra DOBNER, ”More Law, Less Democracy?-Democracy and 
Transnational Constitutionalism”, in Petra DOBNER, Martin LOUGHLIN (eds.), The Twilight…cit., 
pp. 141-161/p. 143.
3 See generally, Rosalind DIXON, Vicki C. JACKSON, ”Constitutions Inside Out: Outsider 
Interventions in Domestic Constitutional Contests”, Wake Forest Law Review (forthcoming); 
UNSW Law Research Paper No. 2012-53. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2174134, 
last accessed March 4, 2013.
4 See, Neil WALKER, Jo SHAW, Stephen TIERNEY (eds.), Europe’s Constitutional Mosaic, 
OR: Hart Publishing, Oxford and Portland, 2011. 
5 Such debates are not confined to the Anglophone legal world; complementary conceptual 
descriptions abound in contemporary legal discourse across legal systems. In German 
public law literature, one also uses, for example, the concepts of ”Teilverfassung” (”partial- or 
complementary- Constitution”) and ”grenzüberschreitende Konstitutionalisierungsprozesse” 
(”cross-border constitutionalization processes”). See, for a forensic chart of the debates and a 
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legal-normative import of the transformations cannot be at this stage authoritatively 
gauged, as one can gather from this taxonomical litany, the general causes and effects 
of the phenomenon are identifiable with relative ease. On the one hand, the increasing 
global, risk-based ”community of fate and faith”1 across governments has resulted in 
the creation of governance instruments whose legal acts have binding effect within 
or at least compelling force on local jurisdictions. At the same time, the decisional 
processes of the adopting institutions escape the direct political-democratic control 
under the national Constitution. 
Such inter-, trans-, or supranational instruments range, on a spectrum delineated 
in terms of the respective degrees of structural density and decisional purview, 
from sectoral regulation and/or adjudication mechanisms (human rights protection 
under the Council of Europe system, free trade regulation under the WTO) to a 
level of normative and institutional integration that approximates classical federal 
arrangements (the case of the EU). On the other hand and by the same token, as the 
decisional clout and level of integration increased and as more competences migrated 
to decisional structures located outside the perimeter of the nation state, juridical 
and participatory protections were added to those supranational and international 
bodies. Changes were undertaken in recognizably inherited patterns, seeking to 
compensate for the erosion of constitutional statehood and the countervailing 
deficits of legitimacy and responsiveness by transposing in adapted form some of the 
institutions of classical, government-related fundamental law. This general process of 
mimetic adaptation and inchoate rapprochement is nowadays ubiquitously dubbed 
constitutionalism or constitutionalization (of the EU, WTO, ECHR, etc.2).
However, by detaching the conceptual language of constitutionalism from 
its customary nation-state contextual environment and heaving it to the level of 
a constitutional Esperanto for use by and among international or supranational 
structures, the vocabulary suffered an interesting metamorphosis. Firstly, inherited 
concepts such as the rule of law, judicial independence or separation of powers needed 
of necessity to be abstracted to a sufficiently high level of generality, in order to (self-)
describe the newer, changed practices of the global institutions and to allow these 
systems to communicate in a common language with their more idiosyncratic classical 
counterparts. Secondly and related, newer, quasi-constitutional terminologies have 
arisen, as cosmopolitan, surrogate conceptual translations for or replacements of the 
skeptical take on the transplant-translation possibilities, Ulrich HALTERN, ”Internationales 
Verfassungsrecht? Anmerkungen zu einer kopernikanischen Wende”, Archiv des öffentliches 
Rechts, vol. 128, 2003, pp. 511-557. 
1 Cf. András SAJÓ, ”Comment-The Judicialized Handling of Global Risk”, in Bogdan 
IANCU (ed.), The Law/Politics Distinction in Contemporary Public Law Adjudication, OR: Eleven 
International Publishing, Utrecht and Portland, 2009, pp. 85-88.
2 The literature on EU constitutionalism has predated and flourished in spite of the 
Constitution Treaty failure. Thus, a recently updated authoritative collection edited by Bogdandy 
and Bast is audaciously titled ”European Constitutional Law” (Europäisches Verfassungsrecht, 
zweite, aktualisierte und erweiterte Auflage, Springer, Heidelberg, Berlin, 2009). See, on the 
”constitutionalization” of the ECHR and WTO systems, Christian Walter’s optimistic ”Die 
Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention als Konstitutionalisierungsprozeß”, Zeitschrift 
für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht (ZaöRV), Bd. 59, 1999, pp. 963-983 and the 
skeptical article by Jeffrey L. DUNOFF, ”Constitutional Conceits: The WTO’s ’Constitution’ and 
the Discipline of International Law”, European Journal of International Law, vol. 17, no. 3, 2006, 
pp. 647-675, respectively. 
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older state-centered notions (e.g., ”good governance”, ”integrity”, ”transparency”, 
”anti-corruption” and the like). 
THE CONTEXT
Over the summer 2012, an attempt was made by a newly formed parliamentary 
majority, hostile to the President of Romania, to remove the incumbent, Traian 
Băsescu1. According to the Romanian Constitution (Art. 95), the President can 
be suspended from office for ”committing grave acts infringing constitutional 
provisions”. A third of the MPs can initiate the procedure. Following the receipt of 
an advisory opinion by the Constitutional Court, an absolute majority must vote on 
the articles of impeachment, in joint sitting of the two Houses, for the suspension to 
take effect. A popular referendum is held within thirty days and, if the impeachment 
is confirmed in the referendum, the president is removed from office. The Speaker 
of the Senate (or, in this order of succession, that of the House of Representative) 
serves as acting president (Art. 98). An interim president exercises almost the full 
gamut of presidential attributions and can also be impeached, for the same reasons 
and following the same procedure (Art. 99). 
A number of procedural hurdles stood in the way of the new majority. The Speakers 
of the two Houses had been appointed by the former party in power. According 
to two constitutional decisions of 2005, the symmetrical removal provisions of the 
Standing Orders of the Houses had been declared unconstitutional. According to the 
two almost identical holdings, a purely political removal of the Speakers contradicted 
”the constitutional principle of [electing the Speakers in conformity with] the political 
configuration resulting from the parliamentary elections”2. 
The removal of a parliamentary Speaker, as well as the vote to suspend the 
President, are effected by parliamentary decisions (hotărâri). According to the text 
of the Constitution, such decisions are not subject to constitutional review but the 
Court’s attributions can be increased by amendments to its organic law. Art. 47 (l) 
in the Constitutions reads: ”[The Constitutional Court] exercises other attributions, 
as provided in its organic law”. Article 27 in the Constitutional Court Law (Law 
47/1992) had been amended in 2010, adding the review of parliamentary decisions 
to the jurisdictional competence of the Court. Constitutional control of parliamentary 
decisions meant in practice that not only the removal of the two Speakers but also 
the decision to suspend the President could be judicially reviewed. In the latter case, 
the review of the legislative decision would have provided the Constitutional Court 
with the possibility to intervene twice in the parliamentary impeachment procedure 
(advisory opinion for the Parliament and a decision on the resolution to suspend the 
president), the second time with binding legal effect. 
A third hindrance concerned the legislative and constitutional regime of the 
impeachment referendum. The Constitution entrenches neither a validity condition 
1 For an earlier, extended version of and comment on this chronology, in the context of the 
July 2012 MCV Commission report, see Bogdan IANCU, ”Romania under EU Influence: Note 
on the Constitutive Limits of External Constitutional Interventions”, PolSci-Romanian Journal of 
Political Science, vol. 12, no. 2, 2012, pp. 53-76. 
2 Decision Nos. 601 and 602 of 14.11.2005, OJ Nos. 1022 and 1027 of 17 and 18.11.2005, 
respectively. 
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(quorum) nor a clear decisional rule (majority) for the procedure, and thus Article 10 
(impeachment referendum) in the Referendum Law 3/2000 has been, over the years, 
repeatedly tinkered with by all parties in power. In 2007, during a prior attempt to 
impeach President Băsescu, the parliamentary majority amended the law, providing 
for an absolute majority (i.e., a majority of voters registered on the electoral lists) 
to remove a president elected in the first ballot and a relative majority (a majority 
of those actually taking part in the referendum) to confirm the impeachment of a 
president elected in the second ballot (Băsescu’s case). The amendment was declared 
unconstitutional. Nonetheless, as the court noted in obiter, nothing prevented the 
Parliament from opting for the same legal solution (i.e., absolute or relative majority) 
in all these hypotheses1. Upon a change in the parliamentary majority, the law was 
again modified by the new government, politically close to the President: Emergency 
Ordinance 103/2009 amended Article 10, so that a quorum (the majority of registered 
voters) was set again as the validity condition of all constitutional referenda, including 
impeachment. Subsequently, the law that approved the ordinance (L. 62/2012) 
modified the article again, raising the procedural bar higher. The new form of the 
provision read: ”The impeachment of the President is approved if voted for by a 
majority of the citizens registered on the electoral lists”.
In the Romanian constitutional system laws can be amended either through 
the ordinary legislative process or by means of delegated, i.e., executive legislation 
(Art. 115). Whereas ordinary delegations are authorized by the Parliament within 
a certain time-limit and within the domain of ordinary legislation, ”constitutional 
delegations” by emergency ordinances are in practice a prerogative of the executive. 
An emergency ordinance needs no enabling law as legal basis, takes effect immediately 
(it must only be ”laid before parliament”, and is considered adopted if neither of the 
legislative chambers takes action within 30 day-periods). Furthermore, emergency 
ordinances can amend organic legislation (such as the Referendum and the 
Constitutional Court Laws). Due to the fact that the current constitutional regime 
immunizes such measures from timely review, ordinances are a wieldy political 
weapon. Unlike ordinary laws, whose constitutional validity can be challenged before 
promulgation, ordinances can be reviewed only ex post, through an exception raised 
by a party in the course of ordinary litigation and referred to the Constitutional Court 
by the case adjudicator (an ordinary court of law or commercial arbitration tribunal). 
This means in practice that, until the dispute is submitted to constitutionality review, 
the political context and stakes would have changed considerably. However, the 
Ombudsman can bring an exception of unconstitutionality against provisions in an 
ordinance directly before the Constitutional Court (Art. 146 [d]). According to the 
Constitution (Art. 58 [1]), the Ombudsman (”Advocate of the People”) is appointed 
for a term of office of 5 years ”to defend the natural persons’ rights and freedoms”.
On July 3, the Parliament revoked the Speakers and the Ombudsman. The 
Ombudsman was accused of challenging the constitutionality of a number of 
ordinances that regulated purely administrative matters and thus of exceeding the 
constitutional mandate of the institution. The likely circumstantial motive was to 
replace the incumbent with an officeholder more sympathetic to the new power. At 
the same time, amendments to the Constitutional Court Law and the Referendum 
1 Decision No. 147 of 2007, OJ No. 162 of 7 March 2007. This obiter appreciation was 
restated in Decision 420 of 3 May 2007.
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Law were made, in the simultaneous form of parliamentary bills and emergency 
ordinances. The most probable rationale for this normative duplication was that, 
in the event that the bill would have been declared unconstitutional, the analogous 
provisions in the ordinances would have remained in force due to the lack of an 
effective remedy. The Constitutional Court was subsequently asked to render its 
position on the impeachment within 24 hours. Following the receipt of a rather 
ambiguous advisory opinion1, the President was suspended on the same day, the 6th 
of July.
The objections of unconstitutionality regarding the legislative proposals to amend 
Law 47/1992 and Law 3/2000 and the constitutional complaints against the removals 
reached the Court and decisions were rendered during early July 2012. The decision 
on the Referendum Law declared the law as amended ”constitutional…insofar as it 
ensures the participation in the referendum of fifty percent plus one of the number of 
citizens registered on the electoral lists”2. This departure from the 2007 jurisprudence, 
which had left the matter at the appreciation of the legislature, was explained with 
a selective reference to a Code of Good Practice in Referenda adopted by the Venice 
Commission, recommending stability in electoral legislation3. But the Court ignored 
the express warning in the same report against quorum provisions in referenda. As 
the Court noted, the provision of a quorum was needed to give effect to popular 
sovereignty and to bolster wide participation of the citizenry as an expression of 
”civic duty”.
The decision on the constitutionality of the Constitutional Court Law amendment 
declared the impugned provision unconstitutional with the reasoning that the Court’s 
jurisdiction cannot be removed for instrumental reasons, while cases are pending. The 
holding added however that only parliamentary decisions that affect ”constitutional 
values, rules, and principles” would be subjected to judicial scrutiny4. Yet, in the cases 
regarding the constitutionality of the actual parliamentary decisions removing the 
two Speakers, the justices did not find a breach of constitutional principles or values, 
in contradiction with the 2005 constitutional jurisprudence referred to above5.
The events that unfolded in the month of August gravitated around the 
constitutionality of the referendum. The permanent electoral lists for presidential 
elections comprised at the time the figure of 18.292.464 registered voters. Eventually, 
8.459.053 citizens (46,24 % of the baseline figure) took part in the referendum on the 29th 
of July. Among these, over 87% voted in favor of dismissal. The vote was influenced 
by the impeached President, who, initially supporting participation, changed tactics 
campaigned for a boycott of the procedure. In a ruling of early August, the Court 
1 Advisory Opinion No. 1 of 6 July 2012, OJ No. 456 of 6 July 2012. The Court rejected 
most of the articles of impeachment, upon the general reasoning that the expression of political 
opinions was not covered by the constitutional impeachment provision, which sanction actual 
deeds. A number of arguments in the impeachment proposal were however validated and the 
appreciation of their seriousness was left at the political discretion of the legislature.
2 Decision No. 731 of 10 July 2012, OJ No. 478 of 12 July 2012. 
3 See Code of Good Practice in Referendums, adopted by the Council for Democratic 
Elections at its 19th meeting (Venice, 16 December 2006) and the Venice Commission at its 70th 
plenary session (Venice, 16-17 March 2007) on the basis of contributions by Pieter van Dijk, 
François Luchaire, and Giorgio Maliverni, CDL-AD (2007)008rev, at p. 23. 
4 Decision No. 727 of 9 July 2012, OJ No. 477 of 12 July 2012. 
5 Decisions Nos. 728 and 729 of 9 July 2012, Of Nos. 478 and 480 of 12 July 2012. 
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declared the boycott fully conformant with the Constitution and equally expressive of 
sovereignty and civic duty. This was especially the case, as the Court observed, when 
”the applicable legislation requires participation”1.
What remained unsettled for a few more weeks was whether the validity of the 
referendum was to be measured in terms of the permanent electoral lists applicable by 
virtue of the Law on the Election of the President (370/2004) or of the general electoral 
laws. The difference is that, whereas the permanent electoral list for presidential 
elections comprises all Romanian citizens over the age of 18, only citizens whose 
residence is registered in their respective constituencies are on the other permanent 
electoral lists. The Court awarded the Government time to update the lists prior to 
a final ruling on the validity, but neither the text of the Referendum Law nor the 
August 2 ruling gave guidance as to what the recount would actually have to bear 
on. A reference in the text intimated that Romanian citizens residing abroad vote on 
”supplementary electoral lists”. In view of massive immigration from Romania over 
the past decades, subtracting the diaspora (1.101.809) voters from the recount figure 
would have decisively tilted the balance. Nonetheless, on the 6th of August, while the 
Court was out of session, an ”errata” making a specific reference to Law 370/2004 
was sent by the justice on duty to the Official Journal and inserted retroactively in 
the original decision; three of the justices, which had taken part in the initial ruling, 
were not informed by the Court President of this change. After a few more weeks, the 
Court invalidated the referendum for lack of quorum2.
CHANGED VOCABULARIES
The Metamorphoses of Corruption and Judicial Independence
Unlike in the case of the previous wave of accession, the last two members of 
the Union have been subjected both to pre-accession scrutiny of the adoption of the 
acquis, including the political conditionality, and to a post-accession monitoring under 
the CVM mechanism. The continued scrutiny reflected the conjoined desire to extend 
the Union and a degree of distrust on the part of the Commission and older Member 
States that the two countries were ready to serve as full-fledged parties in the common 
venture. Judging from the above illustration of the most recent vagaries of Romanian 
constitutionalism, this cautious attitude appears justified. The crux of the matter is, 
however, if the chosen instrument is fit to nudge the fledgling newer additions unto 
the path of requisite civility. 
The chosen benchmarks were ostensibly targeted at precise tasks, expressed in 
neutral, apparently non-political categories: the establishment of a transparent and 
1 Ruling No. 3 of 2 August 2012, OJ No. 546 of 3 August 2012. 
2 Ruling No. 6 of 21 August 2012, OJ No. 616 of 27 August 2012. See the dissenting opinion 
by Justices Toader, Gaşpar, and Predescu: ”Our disagreement with the ruling…rests on the 
fact that it has been adopted by reference to the provisions of Art. 2 (1) of Law 370/2004 on 
the election of the President of Romania, a solution anticipated through the ’errata’ of August 
6, 2012, referring to the Ruling of the Constitutional Court No. 3 of 2 August 2012, an ’errata’ 
regarding the adoption of which we were not consulted, a procedure unprecedented in constitu-
tional jurisprudence”.
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efficient judicial process by enhancing the capacity and accountability of the Superior 
Council of the Magistracy and the adoption of new civil and penal procedure codes, 
the establishment of an integrity agency with the capacity for issuing mandatory 
decisions, and the continuation of the fight against high-level and local government 
corruption. 
Prior to the accession, in 2003, the Constitution had been amended, largely at 
the behest of the Commission, to insulate the judiciary from political encroachments, 
by granting the representative institution of the body of magistrates constitutionally 
entrenched autonomy. At the time, the Commission had perceived this arrangement 
as the perfect guarantee of judicial independence and, in turn and somewhat 
circularly, judicial independence thus understood as the optimal guarantee for 
fostering ”capacity and accountability”. The problem is that the principle as such, 
at this level of abstraction, is a very imperfect proxy for determining an optimal 
institutional setting at the constitutional level. On the one hand, the individual 
independence (immovability) of judges is not coextensive with the autonomy of the 
judiciary as a body. In fact, before the constitutional amendments the Commission 
had to defend the judiciary against political decisions by the executive. Soon after the 
constitutional insulation of the structure the dangers of institutionalized corporatism 
became apparent, whereas the solution to this newer configuration (internal in-
fighting for influence and occult forms of politicization within the judiciary and the 
Council) had by then become much more intractable at the systemic level1. On the 
other hand, magistrates are not, in the Romanian constitutional system, so to speak, 
”equally independent”. The Council of Magistracy is indeed the representative body 
of both judicial and prosecutorial magistrates. The latter category form, nonetheless, 
a hierarchical structure with some apparent executive connotations and attributions, 
recognized in terms of their constitutional and legislative status; the structure is 
designated as ”Public Ministry” and, moreover, the activity of prosecutors is placed 
”under the authority of the Minister of Justice”2.
This setting resulted in a degree of structurally determined irresolution as to 
the proper balance of political (Ministry of Justice) and corporate judicial (Superior 
Council of Magistracy) attributions with respect to the control over the prosecutorial 
body. Furthermore, since the appointment to the higher prosecutorial positions is made 
by the President, whose position within the Executive Branch is, due to gaps in the 
constitutional text, under continuous contention, the situation further is complicated 
in times of cohabitation. 
1 See, on the Romanian case, Bogdan IANCU, ”Post-Accession Constitutionalism with a 
Human Face: Judicial Reform and Lustration in Romania”, European Constitutional Law Review, 
vol. 6, no. 1, 2010, pp. 28-58. See generally, on the perils of working with abstract ready-made 
molds in technical legal assistance programs, Stephen HOLMES, ”Judicial Independence as 
Ambiguous Reality and Insidious Illusion”, in Ronald Dworkin (ed.), From Liberal Values to 
Democratic Transition: Essays in Honor of János Kis, CEU Press, Budapest, 2004, pp. 3-14.
2 For instance, according to Art. 63 (h & i) of Law Regarding Judicial Organization No. 
304/2004 (as republished), prosecutors ”act for the prevention and combating of criminality 
under the coordination of the minister of justice, for the realization of the unitary penal policy of 
the state” and ”study the causes generating and favoring criminality, elaborate and propose to the 
minister of justice measures to eliminate such”. The public law literature in Romania is divided 
on the exact nature of the Public Ministry (i.e., executive, judiciary or mixed). The European 
models offer no trenchant answer to the question, with perhaps a tilt towards the executive.
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The same difficulties or antinomies obtain in the case of anti-corruption 
measures, particularly with respect to the constitutional status of the integrity agency, 
whose independence from direct majoritarian decisions does little to guarantee its 
effectiveness. The Commission used corruption as a proxy for systemic reform and the 
constitutionally guaranteed institutional autonomy of the National Integrity Agency 
as a proxy for optimal output efficiency. Aside from the elusiveness of ”corruption” as 
a reliable, objective indicator of positive systemic change, the mandate of the agency 
has been dramatically altered as a result of constitutional decisions assessing the 
functional implications of institutional independence from the branches of power. 
For instance, the initial attribution of the National Integrity Agency (ANI) to bring 
unjustified asset confiscation actions directly to the administrative court was declared 
unconstitutional since ”jurisdictional” in its nature1. In response to the decision, a 
”buffer” was provided by legislative amendments, so that the administrative 
acts are now screened, prior to the actual adjudication by a Court of Appeals, by 
Wealth Investigation Commissions composed of two judges and a prosecutor2. As 
a result, the cases are in effect pre-judged by a quasi-judicial/quasi-administrative 
body which, in this configuration, serves as a mixture of kangaroo court and Star 
Chamber. This development was to be expected, both in view of prior decisions of the 
Romanian Constitutional Court with respect to the status of autonomous institutions 
and in consideration of the general problematics of administrative autonomy. The 
perplexing dilemma of tabulating in normative-constitutional terms the precise 
functional implications of administrative ”independence” is somewhat of a riddle in 
all constitutional systems (witness the irresolution of ”formalist” and ”functionalist” 
decisions on the matter in American jurisprudence). But the Commission continued 
unabated to perceive the normative impasse in pure policy terms and recommended 
amendments to the organic law regulating the agency, as follows: 
”It appears that the Wealth Investigation Commissions established under 
the revised ANI law at the level of courts of appeal de facto rule on merits of 
cases transmitted by ANI to the same evidential standard as the trial court. 
Such a procedure not only delays the judicial decision-making process but 
also duplicates the role of the Courts of Appeal, which should be competent 
to rule on ANI cases. For this reason, measures will need to be taken to avoid 
inconsistent practice by the Wealth Investigation Commissions. There is a need 
for a further amendment to the law to allow ANI to appeal decisions of the Wealth 
Investigation Commission. Since the Commission’s last annual assessment, only 
two cases of unjustified assets have been confirmed by courts in first instance”3.
If this recommendation would be heeded, the amended law would most likely be 
once vulnerable to a finding of unconstitutionality, aside from the additional problems 
of jurisdictional coordination/duplication. By virtue of making their decisions 
1 Decision No. 415 of 14.04.2010, OJ No. 294 of 05.05.2010. 
2 This structure was provided as enforcement mechanism by Law 155/1996, an earlier 
(and largely ineffective) anti-corruption measure. Nonetheless, in the current legislative 
framework, it functions as a screening interface between the agency and the court; this setting 
raises completely different constitutional implications.
3 Commission Cooperation and Verification Mechanism Progress Report of July 20, 2011, 
COM (2011) 460 final. 
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subject to appeal, the Wealth Investigation Commissions would arguably become, 
by definition, either extraordinary jurisdictions, forbidden by the Constitution or 
special jurisdictions, which must be, according to an odd provision in the Romanian 
Constitution (Art. 21 (4)), ”gratuitous and optional”. 
Behind these apparently technical constitutional conundrums and the endless 
nitpicking lurks the deeper problem that the categories used by the Commission to 
scrutinize the fitness of the Romanian system for equal membership in the European 
club do not appear to yield satisfactory results. To wit, the constitutional events of the 
past few years, culminating in the crisis over the past summer, appear to indicate a 
degree of ”institutional corruption” (in the sense of general and systematic political 
and judicial manipulation of rules and institutions)1 in the face of which a few findings 
of incompatibility and a few successful prosecutions in high stake corruption-related 
cases, commendable though they may be, arguably have diminutive, primarily 
theatrical and decorative effect. 
The Commission seems however to have perceived the deficiency and started, 
in the middle of the crisis, to issue openly constitutional recommendations to 
the Romanian government2. This approach, commendable though it may be in 
principle, is fraught however with perils of its own making. On the one hand and 
at the most trivial level of perception, the Commission lacks an appropriate legal 
basis for its newfangled constitutional proclivities. A first report, over the summer, 
sought to relate the judicial reform attributions to the rule of law and judicial 
independence, these lofty ideals to the Constitutional Court as an independent 
judicature, and the recent constitutional jurisprudence to the functioning of the 
Romanian constitutional system. The last report includes a special sub-heading 
on ”The Romanian Constitutional order”3. This elongated conceptual chain is, of 
course, hardly unassailable. 
On the other and related, the more the Commission intervenes professedly in 
constitutional matters, the higher are the knowledge costs and legitimacy burdens it 
takes upon itself. In the last report, one can for instance read that: ”The Ombudsman 
has an important role in safeguarding the checks and balances of the system, and 
in particular to control the power of the executive to legislate through ordinances”. 
This assertion is, in the logic of the Romanian Constitution, imprecise to the point of 
error. According to the fundamental law, the role of the Ombudsman is not that of a 
separation of powers umpire but the more modest one of ”defending the rights and 
liberties of natural persons” (Art. 58 [1], emphasis added). The attribution of bringing 
exceptions of unconstitutionality to the Court, according to even a lay reading of the 
constitutional text, is subordinated to this specific mandate. 
1 On the concept of institutional corruption, Barry HINDESS, ”International Anti-
corruption as a Programme of Normalization”, in Louís de SOUSA, Peter LARMOUR, Barry 
HINDESS (eds.), Governments, NGOs and Anti-Corruption: The New Integrity Warriors, Routledge, 
New York, NY, 2009, pp. 19-32. Of particular interest in this context is the following remark, at 
p. 24: ”[T]he restriction of press freedom might itself be seen as a clear case of […] ’institutional 
corruption’ in which the gain is political rather than personal….This kind of corruption is 
hardly something that can be compensated for by a crackdown on corruption in other areas”.
2 See generally, on the July 2012 MCV report, Bogdan IANCU, ”Romania under EU 
influence... cit.”
3 COM (2013)47 final, Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the 
Council on Progress in Romania under the Co-operation and Verification Mechanism, Brussels 
30.1.2013. 
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Another recent recommendation is more problematic still. In the last country 
report, under the heading of ”Independence of the judiciary”, upon a general, 
unsubstantiated reference to media ”pressure on judicial institutions and lack 
of respect for the independence of the judiciary”, an entreat to the government is 
placed to ”ensure that freedom of the press is accompanied by a proper protection of 
institutions and of individuals’ fundamental rights as well as to provide for effective 
redress”. Leaving aside the fact that institutions are not possessed of fundamental 
rights and that few constitutional systems limit free speech to protect institutions 
(such rules were common in the criminal code under the empire of the Constitution of 
the Social Republic of Romania of 1965 but have been abandoned in the meanwhile), 
what constitutes effective redress with respect to libel or slander depends on a deeply 
political-constitutional choice with respect to the public sphere. Whether, for example, 
more privacy to speech (France) or more speech to privacy (the U.K. or the U.S.) is 
preferred is a political value judgment for which there no general constitutional 
recipe is at hand, ready-made for bureaucratic application. Consequently, very 
little legitimacy can be found for a choice located beyond the democratic reach of 
the concerned political community. Furthermore, the lowest pan-European common 
denominator in human rights respects, the ECtHR jurisprudence, seems to indicate 
rather the opposite, namely, that one should err on the side of free speech, and protect 
political debate, even when it is unpalatable or even insulting or aggressive, and 
especially when it is directed at a public person1.
The Values of Serenity 
A number of recommendations in the Venice Commission report duplicate the 
misgivings in the EU Commission monitoring assessments. For instance, it is stated 
in this latter document that 
”If the Advocate of the People were not able to appeal to the Constitutional 
Court against government emergency ordinances in all cases – not only in 
human rights cases –, a serious gap in the necessary control of such ordinances 
would occur. No other state body than the Advocate of the People can directly 
appeal against such ordinances to the Constitutional Court and, consequently, 
all emergency ordinances, which do not relate to human rights, could not be 
controlled at all”2.
Aside from the reasons already iterated above, it is unapparent how the specific 
action, ultra vires and thus plainly unconstitutional, of one institution, could remedy 
general and potential unconstitutionality problems.
Other considerations in the opinion are equally troubling. Reviewing the 
succession of events in the impeachment process, the authors express their concern 
that ”the procedure as a whole implie[d] that the dismissal of the President may have 
been politically motivated rather than based on a sound legal basis”3. Nonetheless, unlike the 
1 See Lingens v. Austria (1986), 8 EHRR 407.
2 Opinion no. 685/2012 of 17 December 2012, CDL-AD (2012) 026, Par. 55. 
3 Ibidem, Par. 45 (emphasis supplied). 
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case of presidential suspension from office subsequent to a conviction for high treason, 
where even though the procedure is triggered by a political vote in Parliament serving 
as formal indictment before the High Court of Cassation and Justice, the decision as 
such is judicially determined and has a sound legal basis in criminal law (Art. 96), 
impeachment follows a majoritarian-democratic course throughout. Such procedures 
are in fact commonly regarded as political in nature. In the case of the United States, for 
instance, where the entire impeachment process takes place within the legislature, the 
Supreme Court has explicitly stated, that such matters fall outside its judicial capacity 
and, as long as the procedure as such is followed, the substantive outcome as such 
is a result of pure political choice. In other words, according to the Supreme Court, 
whether the US Senate ”tries” properly an impeachment is a ”political question”1. 
Just like ”other High Crimes and Misdemeanors”, the meaning of the Romanian 
counterpart expression, ”grave acts in breach of the Constitutional provisions”, cannot 
be read in a purely juridical key. This is all the more evident in view of the fact that 
many of the attributions of the Romanian President are broadly formulated (e.g., Art. 
80 [2], ”mediation between the powers of the state and between state and society”). 
The ”legal basis” is therefore covered by following the constitutional procedure itself, 
with its steps concluding in a popular referendum. 
In closing, the Venice report includes a general section on ”Mutual respect 
and loyal co-operation between institutions”2. Within it the reader can find, amid 
benevolent digressions on the values of harmony, the following sentence: 
”Only mutual respect can lead to the establishment of mutually accepted 
practices, which are in compliance with the European Constitutional Heritage 
and which enable a country to serenely overcome crises”3.
The concert that was expected by the fathers of classical constitutional theory 
(Montesquieu, Madison, etc.) to follow from checks and balances was a dynamic 
one, arising from power arresting power, not from anthropomorphic expectations 
of gentlemanlike demeanor in institutional relations. Furthermore, one does not 
necessarily have to be a dyed-in-the-wool Schmittian to notice the slightly oxymoronic 
overtones of the expression ”serenely overcome crises” and not much of a legal 
historian to know that there is little in the name of ”European Constitutional Heritage” 
to give authoritative directions on the general issue of democratic tranquility. If 
anything, examples abound of lack of serenity in constitutional politics and, as long as 
procedures and judicial decisions are duly followed, it is in good democratic tradition 
and hefty Jeffersonian temper to experience crises from time to time. 
CONCLUSION
One could of course choose to oversee most of the occasional missteps in the 
reports, attributing them to incompetence or insufficient information. Proceeding 
upon the sound assumption that it is impossible to recommend specific changes to 
1 Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993). 
2 Pars. 72-76. 
3 Ibidem, Par. 73. 
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a legal system until one first understands it well, the more affable reader would thus 
place her hopes in more competent future research work by the EU Commission 
and their counterparts in Venice. Indeed, if competent assistance were at hand, few 
locals would deny in good conscience that the country is in need of it. Romania is 
an unsettled democracy and has arguably, apart from a brief period of relatively 
successful, albeit incomplete and superficial modernization between the end of the 
Great War and the rise of authoritarianism, always been so. More particularly, the 
Union is not to blame for this state of facts or for the constitutional and parliamentary 
orgy over the summer, although the Commission can be partly blamed for the abrupt 
further decay of democratic standards in the immediate aftermath of the accession. 
This state of play can be partly attributed to the disappointment of high local Europe-
related expectations which are at least partly a result of the Commission’s myopic, 
slapdash pre- and post-accession monitoring. 
The most troubling aspect of this interaction, however, does not reside in the 
indicated technical errors but in the deeper implications of the general approach. There 
is, in both instances, a general tendency to substitute an abstract understanding of law 
for democracy and to push majoritarian politics into the background. Powers ought 
to cooperate, democratic choices must be subdued, free speech (against institutions) 
is to be gagged on the basis of innuendos.
The Janus-face nature of the Constitution, straddling particularity and universality, 
membership and exclusion, political and juridical forms, could be tamed as long as 
the debates were carried in the framework of the national state which served in turn 
as a stable location for the dynamic interplay of these antinomies. As soon as the 
inherited terms and vocabularies are lifted in the airy space of Platonic forms, one 
perceives immediately the extent to which they are voided of stable sense and open 
for endless manipulation.
